Cybercrime and Punishment
with William Neilson (Journal of Legal Studies, June 2020)
Abstract: This paper models cybercrime by adding an active victim to the seminal Becker model of crime. The victim invests in security that may protect her from a cybercrime and, if the cybercrime is thwarted, generate evidence that can be used for prosecution. Successful crimes leave insufficient evidence for apprehension and conviction, thus, cannot be punished. Results show that increased penalties for cybercriminals lead them to exert more effort and make cybercrimes more likely to succeed. Above a threshold they also lead victims to invest less in security. It may be impossible to deter cybercriminals by punishing them. Deterrence is possible, but not necessarily optimal, through punishing the victim, such as data controllers or processors who fail to protect their networks.
Optimal Contest Design when Policing Damaging Behavior
with Scott Gilpatric (Games, 14, no. 3: 48)
Abstract: We consider the design of a contest in which the prize may motivate not only productive effort but also some damaging aggressive behavior by contestants. The organizer must choose prizes and an enforcement regime defined as a limit on how much aggressiveness will be tolerated and the probability of inspection. We find that optimal contest design leads to tolerating less aggressive behavior if the inspection measure is less accurate. When the value of contestants’ output is low it may be optimal to motivate much less effort than first best, because the prize spread necessary to induce higher effort necessitates a high level of enforcement, which is not worth the cost. When the value of output is sufficiently high it becomes optimal to offer a high prize spread to motivate effort that is substantial but still below first-best, with costly enforcement then being employed to constrain damaging actions.
Self-defense Regulations and Crime
with Liang Yin (Under Review)
Abstract: This paper provides a theoretical model and an empirical analysis of Stand Your Ground (SYG) laws, which permit greater use of force in self-defense. We built a game-theoretical model based on Becker [1968], showing that SYG laws can increase the arming of both victims and perpetrators, which deters some violent crimes but encourages others. In particular, the model suggests that SYG laws 1.can increase murder rates, because they encourage victims to prepare for a stronger violent defense, and 2. can increase unplanned murders more than planned murders, by increasing the frequency with which lesser crimes escalate into more violent ones. We then use a difference-in-difference empirical analysis to test these implications. We find that, consistent with the model, SYG laws in the US increased planned murder rate by 7.6% and unplanned murders by 10.4%, on average.